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THE SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TEST: WHY THE 




Be careful when you wade into murky water! In 1972, Congress granted 
authority to regulate the waters of the United States to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Water Act (CWA). Since then, 
the courts have labored to define waters of the United States resulting in a 
4-1-4 plurality opinion in the principal case of Rapanos v. United States. 
The Rapanos Court identified two tests for defining waters of the United 
States, one articulated by the plurality, and one by Justice Kennedy—the 
significant nexus test. The significant nexus test, while broadly followed, 
has failed to limit EPA overreach. 
EPA jurisdiction warrants a bright-line rule due to concerns about 
cooperative federalism, regulatory efficiency, resource allocation of the 
EPA, and stewardship of private lands. Violations of the CWA can result in 
substantial civil and criminal penalties. To avoid these consequences, small 
businesses, particularly private landowners and farmers, require certainty 
and regulatory clarity which cannot be obtained through nebulous terms of 
art like “significant nexus.”  
The simplest solution is often the best solution. Justice Scalia offered 
such a simple solution in his plurality opinion in the principal case. His 
simple bright-line rule is based on the specific characteristics of the water 
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(or wetland), such as its physical connection to traditionally covered waters 
and its relative permanence. This clarity maximizes resource allocation to 
protect the nation’s natural resources, maintains fidelity to the nation’s 
system of federalism, and reinforces confidence in private land use and 
development. 
Congress delegated regulatory authority under the CWA to the EPA in 
order to control the pollution of the waters of the United States. Since 
passing the CWA, the meaning of the phrase “waters of the United States” 
has been expanded and contracted through agency interpretation and 
judicial review. Under the latest rule promulgated by the EPA (the 
“WOTUS Rule”), the EPA purported to extend its reach under the CWA by 
clarifying the phrase “waters of the United States.” Now, the courts are 
again presented with the question of Congress’s intent in passing the CWA. 
While the future of the WOTUS Rule remains uncertain, this article will 
analyze the debate surrounding the EPA’s recent claim of jurisdiction and 
advocate for a clear bright-line rule upon adjudication of a case currently 
before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
I. Context and Summary of Litigation Before the Sixth Circuit 
In 1972 Congress passed the CWA1 to control the pollution of the 
nation’s waters.2 For over a century, the accepted meaning of the phrase 
“waters of the United States,” as it pertained to federal legislation, was 
interstate waters that were actually navigable.3 The Supreme Court, in a 
more recent line of cases, has refined the meaning of this phrase to allow 
meaningful regulation by the EPA and Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps,” 
“Corps of Engineers,” or collectively with the EPA, the “Agencies”), under 
the CWA, while remaining mindful of the principles of federalism and 
private property rights.4  
The WOTUS Rule was promulgated on June 29, 2015.5 In it the EPA 
claimed to “clarify” the definition of the phrase “waters of the United 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 86 Stat. 884, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2015). 
 2. The “Clean Water Act” was originally billed as the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments of 1972. See W. Henry Graddy, IV, Let Us Hope for Smart Fish: A Clean 
Water Act Practitioner’s Search for Ratchet Down, 10 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 161, 
162 (1995). 
 3. See The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557 (1871). 
 4. See United States. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Solid Waste 
Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); 
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
 5. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 FR 37054-01. 
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States” under the CWA.6 The WOTUS Rule was scheduled to become 
effective on August 28, 2015.7 However, on August 27, 2015, in an action 
brought on behalf of thirteen states, a federal district judge in North Dakota 
granted an injunction against the EPA finding, in part, that because the 
WOTUS Rule purports to exert authority over bodies of water that bear no 
significant nexus to navigable waters, the rule likely “violates the 
congressional grant of authority to the EPA.”8  
Threats by the federal government to impose the new rule on the thirty-
seven states not party to the suit were met by strong opposition by many 
state attorneys general.9 On September 4, 2015, the federal judge in North 
Dakota declared that his ruling only applied to the parties to the original 
action in North Dakota.10 Finally, on October 9, 2015, in an action brought 
on behalf of Ohio, Michigan, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Georgia, West Virginia, Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, the North Carolina Department of Environmental and Natural 
Resources, South Carolina, Utah, and Wisconsin (all thirty-one states 
challenging the WOTUS Rule are collectively referred to as the “Opposing 
States”), the Sixth Circuit granted a nationwide stay of enforcement of the 
rule pending a judicial determination on the merits.11 
II. Background of Federal Water Pollution Regulation 
A. Traditional Meaning of Waters of the United States 
One-hundred and one years before passing the CWA, the United States 
Supreme Court defined navigable waters as those waters “which are 
navigable in fact.”12 The Court elaborated that rivers are “navigable in fact 
when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary 
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or 
may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.”13  
                                                                                                                 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. North Dakota v. U.S. EPA, No. 3:15-CV-59, 2015 WL 5060744, at *5 (D.N.D. 
Aug. 27, 2015). 
 9. See, e.g., Press Release, Scott Pruitt, AG Pruitt Comments on North Dakota Federal 
Judge’s Ruling Blocking Implementation of WOTUS Rule (Aug. 28, 2015) (on file with 
author). 
 10. Order Limiting the Scope of Preliminary Injunction to the Plaintiffs, Civil No. 3:15-
cv-59 (Sep. 4, 2015). 
 11. In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 12. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 563 (1871). 
 13. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
490 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 1 
 
 
[Waters] constitute navigable waters of the United States within 
the meaning of the acts of Congress . . . when they form in their 
ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other 
waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be 
carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary 
modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.14  
The Mississippi River is an example of an interstate navigable water—a 
traditional water of the United States. This interpretation of federal 
regulatory jurisdiction remained relatively unchanged until the passage of 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. 
B. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 
In 1972, Congress amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 
which after further amendments in 1977 became the Clean Water Act.15 
The CWA “restructured federal authority over water pollution control, 
consolidating most regulatory authority over discharges to the nation’s 
waters with the [EPA], but left the Corps with jurisdiction over dredge and 
fill activity.”16 
The CWA provides, “[e]xcept as in compliance with [various sections of 
the CWA], the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be 
unlawful.”17 The CWA further provides for two permitting systems, the 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES),18 and Permits 
for Dredged or Fill Material.19 Negligent violations of permit conditions or 
limitations incur criminal penalties, for the first offense, of “not less than 
$2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for 
not more than 1 year, or by both.”20 
The Administrator of the EPA (“Administrator”) may grant a NPDES 
permit for “point source”21 discharges of pollution, or it may waive the 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Thomas L. Casey III, Testing Rapanos: United States v. Robinson and the 
Future of “Navigable Waters”, 10 Engage: J. Federalist Soc’y Prac. Groups 39 (2009) 
(providing an outstanding summary of the CWA). 
 16. Id. 
 17. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). 
 18. 33 U.S.C. § 1342. 
 19. 33 U.S.C. § 1344. 
 20. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1). 
 21. A point source is “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but 
not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, 
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from 
which pollutants are or may be discharged, [and specifically excludes] agricultural 
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permitting requirement upon Administrator approval of a state administered 
permitting system.22 The Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of 
the Corps of Engineers, may issue or deny permits for the discharge of 
“dredged or fill material” into navigable waters.23  
The CWA defines “navigable waters” as “waters of the United States, 
including the territorial seas.”24 In other words, everything that falls within 
the EPA’s interpretation of the phrase “waters of the United States” is by 
definition a navigable water insofar as it is covered by the CWA. 
The Court has been left to determine Congress’s intent in using the 
phrase “waters of the United States” when it delegated the authority to 
enforce CWA to the EPA.25 By 1975, the phrase had been expanded beyond 
the historical concept of “navigability,”26 and came to include “‘freshwater 
wetlands’ adjacent to other covered waters.”27 What followed was a line of 
cases meant to shape the jurisdictional reach of the EPA and Corps of 
Engineers over waters, waterways, and wetlands lying within the borders of 
the United States. 
C. Agency Rulemaking and Judicial Deference 
Analysis of agency propriety in promulgating new rules must begin with 
a baseline understanding of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The 
                                                                                                                 
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture. 33 U.S.C. § 1362; See 
also Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1332 (2013) 
(interpreting Congress’ mandate to the EPA to require NPDES permitting for “stormwater 
discharges [into navigable waters] associated with industrial activity”). 
 22. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(e). 
 23. 33 U.S.C. § 1344. 
 24. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). Note the relevance of the defined term. Would a jurisdictional 
bright-line be better drawn by defining waters of the United States as meaning navigable 
waters, including the territorial seas? This legislative ambiguity lies at the heart of the debate 
over the EPA’s jurisdictional reach. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 
U.S. 121, 133 (1985) (“Congress evidently intended to repudiate limits that had been placed 
on federal regulation by earlier water pollution control statutes and to exercise its powers 
under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed 
‘navigable’ under the classical understanding of that term.”) 
 25. See United States. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Solid Waste 
Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); 
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
 26. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 
1975) (“[A]s used in the [Clean] Water Act, the term [“navigable waters”] is not limited to 
the traditional tests of navigability.”) 
 27. Casey, supra note 15, at 40 (citing 40 Fed. Reg. 31, 321 (1975)). 
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APA requires notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register.28 
After publication of notice, “the agency shall give interested persons an 
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written 
data, views, or arguments.”29 This requirement is sometimes referred to as 
the “notice-and-comment requirement” of the APA. When modifications 
are made to the proposed rule, the agency only satisfies the notice of 
proposed rulemaking requirements if the modifications to the final adopted 
rule are a “logical outgrowth” of such notice.30 “A [modification to a] final 
rule is a logical outgrowth if affected parties should have anticipated that 
the relevant modification was possible.”31 
In reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers, a court 
must determine whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue” or whether “the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue.”32 If Congress’s intent is clear and 
unambiguous, such intent is given effect.33 Conversely, if the statute is 
silent or ambiguous regarding the specific issue, the agency’s construction 
is entitled to deference if such construction is not “arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute” (judicial deference under this analysis is 
“Chevron deference”).34 
III. The Shaping of the Supreme Court’s EPA Water Regulation 
Jurisprudence 
A. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes 
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes35 centered on the Corps’ 
construction of the CWA to include “freshwater wetlands” within the 
meaning of “waters of the United States.” The Corps defined freshwater 
wetlands as: 
those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground 
water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and 
under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of 
                                                                                                                 
 28. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
 29. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
 30. See Sprint Corp. v. FCC, 315 F.3d 369, 375-76 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Allina Health 
Services v. Sebelius, 746 F.3d 1102, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 31. Allina Health Services, 746 F.3d at 1107 (emphasis added). 
 32. Chevron, USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 843-44; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 35. 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985). 
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vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. 
Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar 
areas.36 
Respondent, Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (“Riverside”), owned 80 
acres of low-lying marshland near the shore of Lake St. Clair in Michigan.37 
In 1976, to prepare for the construction of a housing development on the 
property, Riverside placed fill materials on the property.38 The Corps of 
Engineers sued in federal district court to enjoin Riverside from filling the 
property without the Corps’ permission because the property was an 
“adjacent wetland,” and thus within the Corps’ jurisdictional control.39 
The district court granted the injunction and held that the portion of 
Riverside’s property lying less than 575.5 feet above sea level was a 
wetland covered by the CWA.40 On appeal, the case was remanded for 
consideration of the effect of later amendments to the CWA added in 
1977.41 On remand, the district court again granted the injunction to the 
Corps because the property was a wetland within the Corps’ regulatory 
jurisdiction.42 Riverside again appealed and the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed because the semiaquatic characteristics of the Riverside 
property “were not the result of frequent flooding by the nearby navigable 
waters,” which likely fell outsides Congress’s intended grant of regulatory 
authority to the Corps.43 
After granting certiorari, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed the Sixth 
Circuit.44 The Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that “frequent 
flooding” by the adjacent navigable water is a “sine qua non of a wetland 
under the regulation.”45 The Court noted the difficulty in determining the 
“point at which water ends and land begins.”46 However, the district court’s 
findings were not clearly erroneous because Riverside’s property was 
“characterized by the presence of vegetation that requires saturated soil 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Id. (citing 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1978)). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 125. 
 41. Id. The relevant changes in the amendments of 1975 and 1977 were minimal, but 
the latter eliminated the use of the phrase “periodic inundation.” Id. at 124. 
 42. Id. at 125. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 126. 
 45. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 129. 
 46. Id. at 132. 
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conditions for growth and reproduction[,] . . . the source of the saturated 
soil conditions on the property was ground water[, and . . . the] property 
was adjacent to a body of navigable water [in that the] saturated soil 
conditions and wetland vegetation extended beyond the boundary of 
respondent’s property to . . . a navigable waterway.”47  
The Court noted that by defining “‘navigable waters’ as ‘the waters of 
the United States’ [Congress intended to make] it clear that the term 
‘navigable’ as used in the [CWA] is of limited import.”48 The purpose of 
the Corps’ permitting authority was a “legislative attempt to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s 
waters.”49 Therefore, “Congress chose to define the waters covered by the 
[CWA] broadly.”50 “Because [Riverside’s] property is part of a wetland that 
actually abuts on a navigable waterway,” the Corps and the EPA’s 
determination that such land is within its jurisdiction was reasonable.51 
B. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of 
Engineers  
In 1986, the Corps attempted to exert jurisdiction over isolated waters, 
not necessarily adjacent to navigable waters, which “are or would be used 
as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird Treaties [or by] migratory 
birds which cross state lines” (the “Migratory Bird Rule”).52 Fifteen years 
later, the Corps’ expansive reach under the Migratory Bird Rule received 
the scrutiny of the United States Supreme Court.53 
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) was a 
consortium of Chicago suburban municipalities “united in an effort to 
locate and develop a disposal site for baled nonhazardous solid waste.”54 
SWANCC located a site for its project comprising a sand and gravel mining 
site that was abandoned around 1960 and had “[given] way to a successful 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. at 130-31 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 48. Id. at 133. 
 49. Id. at 132 (quoting CWA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 50. Id. at 133. 
 51. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 134-35 (emphasis added). 
 52. 51 Fed.Reg. 41206-01 (1986). Of note, the regulation also purported to exert the 
Corps’ jurisdiction over water “[u]sed to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.” Id. 
 53. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 54. Id. at 162-63. 
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stage forest . . . [and] a scattering of permanent and seasonal ponds of 
varying size.”55 
The Corps initially concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the 
site, but reversed its decision upon notification by the Illinois Nature 
Preserves Commission that migratory birds were observed at the site.56 
SWANCC proposed several plans to mitigate damage and preserve the site 
for the migratory birds and then received permits and approval from the 
Cook County Board of Appeals, the Illinois Environmental Protection 
Agency, and the Illinois Department of Conservation, but the Corps 
insistently refused to issue the Dredge or Fill permit under § 1344 of the 
CWA.57 
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals from summary 
judgment in favor of the Corps, SWANCC argued that the Corps had 
exceeded its authority in claiming jurisdiction over “nonnavigable, isolated, 
intrastate waters based on the presence of migratory birds and in the 
alternative, that Congress lacked the power under the Commerce Clause to 
grant such regulatory jurisdiction.”58 The court of appeals ruled for the 
Corps on both grounds.59  
Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed 
the Seventh Circuit’s ruling.60 The Court noted that, in passing the CWA, 
“Congress chose to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary 
responsibilities and rights of States to [regulate] pollution . . . and use . . . of 
land and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in the 
exercise of his authority under this chapter.”61 The Court interpreted the 
holding in Riverside to require a “significant nexus between the wetlands 
and ‘navigable waters.’”62 The Court distinguished Riverside from 
SWANCC by noting that the latter involves “wetlands that are not adjacent 
to bodies of open waters.”63  
                                                                                                                 
 55. Id. at 163. 
 56. Id. at 164. 
 57. Id. at 165. 
 58. Id. at 165-66. 
 59. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 166. 
 60. Id. at 161. 
 61. Id. at 166-67 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1251(b)). 
 62. Id. at 167 (emphasis added). This was the genesis of what would later become an 
important phrase in the Court’s CWA jurisprudence. 
 63. Id.  
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The term “navigable waters” shaped the Court’s opinion as to “what 
Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA.”64 The Court 
held that expansion of the Corps’ authority “over ponds and mudflats 
falling within the Migratory Bird Rule would result in a significant 
impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power over land and 
water use.”65 Because such an expansive interpretation of the CWA would 
have “alter[ed] the federal-state framework by permitting federal 
encroachment upon traditional state power,” and it was not supported by “a 
clear indication that Congress intended that result,” the Court refused to 
defer to the Corps’ expansive interpretation of the CWA.66 
C. Rapanos v. United States 
The Court’s CWA jurisprudence culminated in the 2006 decision 
Rapanos v. United States.67 Rapanos resulted in a plurality, 4-1-4, opinion, 
which invalidated the Corps’ claim of jurisdiction, but established two 
important tests for determining the meaning of the phrase “waters of the 
United States.”68 
Rapanos was a consolidated case.69 John Rapanos (“Rapanos”) 
backfilled a wetland on his property, more particularly described as “land 
with sometimes-saturated soil conditions . . . [lying] 11 to 20 miles [from 
the nearest body of navigable water].”70 The Corps claimed that Rapanos’s 
saturated fields fell within the definition of “waters of the United States,” 
under the CWA.71 Because he backfilled his fields without a permit to do so 
from the Corps of Engineers, Rapanos was subjected to “[t]welve years of 
criminal and civil litigation.”72  The district court held that Corps had 
properly claimed jurisdiction because the wetlands were adjacent to “waters 
of the United States” and that petitioner was liable for violating the CWA.73 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed based on federal 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id. at 172. 
 65. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 66. Id. at 172-73. 
 67. 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
 68. Id. at 716 (Syllabus by the Court). 
 69. Id. at 729. The actual case involved additional petitioners. For simplicity, this author 
outlines the facts and circumstances of only one of the petitioners, John Rapanos. This 
omission does not affect the subsequent legal analysis in any material way. 
 70. Id. at 719-20. 
 71. Id. at 720-21. 
 72. Id. at 721. 
 73. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 715 (Syllabus by the Court). 
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jurisdiction over sites with “hydrologic connections to the nearby ditches or 
drains, or to remote navigable waters.”74 
In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s 
“hydrologic connection” analysis, vacated the judgments below, and 
remanded for further proceedings.75 Two rationales underlie the Court’s 
invalidation of the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction, one articulated by the 
plurality, and the other given by Justice Kennedy in a separate concurrence. 
1. “Rapanos Plurality Test” 
Writing for the plurality, Justice Scalia emphasized that the burden of 
regulatory compliance with the Corps’ permitting requirements “is not 
trivial.”76 The plurality complained about the pervasiveness of the Corps 
and the EPA’s broad assertions of jurisdiction over the “waters of the 
United States.”77 Scalia also emphasized that “the CWA [only] authorizes 
federal jurisdiction . . . over ‘waters,’ [not over dry land].”78  
The plurality defined a water of the United States as “[(1)] a relatively 
permanent body of water [(2)] connected to traditional interstate navigable 
waters.”79 The plurality further articulated the Corps’ jurisdiction over 
wetlands to cover those wetlands that have “a continuous surface 
connection with [a water of the United States], making it difficult to 
determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”80 
2. “Significant Nexus Test” 
Writing only for himself, but joining in the holding, Justice Kennedy 
devised an alternate approach by expounding upon the phrase “significant 
nexus” mentioned by the SWANCC Court.81 Kennedy took issue with the 
plurality’s requirement that a body of water must be relatively permanent 
because, in his view, such a requirement would exclude “torrents [of water] 
thundering at irregular intervals through otherwise dry channels,” citing the 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 757. 
 76. Id. (plurality opinion) (“The average applicant for an individual permit spends 788 
days and $271,596 in completing the process, and the average applicant for a nationwide 
permit spends 313 days and $28,915.”) 
 77. See id. at 722 (“In the last three decades, the Corps and the [EPA] have interpreted 
their jurisdiction . . . to cover 270-to-300 million acres of swampy lands . . . including half of 
Alaska and an area the size of California in the lower 48 States”). 
 78. Id. at 731. 
 79. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742 (emphasis added). 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 167. 
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Los Angeles River as an example of such a watercourse that might fall 
outside the Agencies’ jurisdiction.82 The Agencies’ claim of jurisdiction 
over such watercourses, according to Kennedy, would be entitled to 
Chevron deference.83 
Kennedy further contended that the plurality’s requirement of a 
“continuous surface connection” was unsupported by the holding in 
Riverside in part because “the connection might well exist only during 
floods.”84 However, Kennedy noted, “mere hydrologic connection should 
not suffice in all cases, . . . [a]bsent some measure of the significance of the 
connection for downstream water quality [of traditionally navigable 
waters].”85 Kennedy conceded that “the word ‘navigable’ in the [CWA] 
must be given some effect” by stating, “[w]hen . . . wetlands’ effects on 
water quality are speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the zone 
fairly encompassed by the statutory term ‘navigable waters.’”86  
Kennedy’s test for the Agencies’ jurisdiction under the CWA requires a 
finding of a significant nexus between traditionally navigable waters and 
the wetland at issue. Kennedy would require that “the wetlands, either alone 
or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly 
affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered 
waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”87 
IV. Analysis of the Current Challenge Before the Sixth Circuit 
A. Overview of the WOTUS Rule 
The WOTUS Rule categorically asserts EPA jurisdiction over interstate 
waters, territorial seas, impoundments of jurisdictional waters, covered 
tributaries, and covered adjacent waters.88 The WOTUS Rule also makes 
numerous categorical exclusions.89 Finally, the WOTUS Rule establishes 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 769-70 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 83. Id. at 770. 
 84. Id. at 773-74. 
 85. Id. at 784 (emphasis added). 
 86. Id. at 779-80. 
 87. Id. at 780 (emphasis added). 
 88. 33 C.F.R § 328.3. 
 89. The Final WOTUS Rule purports to exclude: 
(1) Waste treatment systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons 
designed to meet the requirements of the Clean Water Act. 
(2) Prior converted cropland. Notwithstanding the determination of an 
area's status as prior converted cropland by any other Federal agency, 
for the purposes of the Clean Water Act, the final authority regarding 
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that the significant nexus analysis will be applied on a case-specific basis 
over prairie potholes, Carolina and Delmarva bays, pocosins, Western 
Vernal pools in California, Texas coastal prairie wetlands, waters within the 
100-year floodplain of a traditional navigable water, interstate water, or the 
territorial seas (unless falling within a listed exclusion), waters within 4,000 
feet of the high tide line or the ordinary high water mark of a traditional 
                                                                                                                 
Clean Water Act jurisdiction remains with EPA. 
(3) The following ditches: 
i. Ditches with ephemeral flow that are not a relocated tributary 
or excavated in a tributary. 
ii. Ditches with intermittent flow that are not a relocated 
tributary, excavated in a tributary, or drain wetlands. 
iii. Ditches that do not flow, either directly or through another 
water, into [waters which are currently used, were used in the 
past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign 
commerce, including waters which are subject to the ebb and 
flow of the tide; interstate waters, including interstate 
wetlands; or territorial seas]. 
(4) The following features: 
i. Artificially irrigated areas that would revert to dry land should 
application of water to that area cease; 
ii. Artificial, constructed lakes and ponds created in dry land such 
as farm and stock watering ponds, irrigation ponds, settling 
basins, fields flooded for rice growing, log cleaning ponds, or 
cooling ponds; 
iii. Artificial reflecting pools or swimming pools created in dry 
land; 
iv. Small ornamental waters created in dry land; 
v. Water-filled depressions created in dry land incidental to 
mining or construction activity, including pits excavated for 
obtaining fill, sand, or gravel that fill with water; 
vi. Erosional features, including gullies, rills, and other ephemeral 
features that do not meet the definition of tributary, non-
wetland swales, and lawfully constructed grassed waterways; 
and 
vii. Puddles. 
(5) Groundwater, including groundwater drained through subsurface 
drainage systems. 
(6) Stormwater control features constructed to convey, treat, or store 
stormwater that are created in dry land. 
(7) Wastewater recycling structures constructed in dry land; detention 
and retention basins built for wastewater recycling; groundwater 
recharge basins; percolation ponds built for wastewater recycling; 
and water distributary structures built for wastewater recycling. 
Id. 
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navigable water, interstate water, the territorial seas, impoundments, or 
covered tributary (unless falling within a listed exclusion), and similarly 
situated waters.90 
In promulgating the new WOTUS Rule, the Agencies primarily rely 
upon Justice Kennedy’s formulation of the significant nexus test.91 The 
Agencies applied this “analytical framework” to a myriad of factual 
circumstances.92 The Agencies seek to define certain terms and phrases left 
undefined by Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test in Rapanos, such as: 
(a) “similarly situated” waters,93  (b) “in the region,” and (c) the functions 
to be determined in analyzing whether certain waters significantly affect the 
chemical, physical, or biological integrity of covered waters.94 
The Agencies defined the phrase “‘similarly situated’ in terms of 
whether particular waters are providing common, or similar, functions for 
downstream waters such that it is reasonable to consider their effect 
together.”95 The Agencies defined “region [as] the watershed that drains to 
the nearest [covered water].”96 
In the significant nexus analysis, the Agencies claim that in identifying 
the relevant functions—those functions that significantly affect the 
chemical, physical, or biological integrity of covered waters—the Agencies 
were “informed by the goals of the statute and the available science.”97 The 
rule states: 
Functions to be considered for the purposes of determining 
significant nexus are sediment trapping; nutrient recycling; 
pollutant trapping, transformation, filtering, and transport; 
retention and attenuation of floodwaters; runoff storage; 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Id. 
 91. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37054-
01, 37061 (2015). 
 92. See id. (“[T]here is no indication in [Justice Kennedy’s] opinion that the analytical 
framework his opinion provides for determining significant nexus for adjacent wetlands is 
limited to adjacent wetlands.”) 
 93. The rule appears to use “wetlands” and “waters” interchangeably. 
 94. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37054-
01, 37065 (2015). 
 95. Id. at 37066. 
 96. Id. at 37066-67. The United States Geological Society defines “watershed” as “the 
area of land where all of the water that falls in it and drains off of it goes to a common 
outlet.” In other words, all land is within a watershed! U.S. Geological Society, What Is A 
Watershed?, http://www.water.usgs.gov/edu/watershed.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2015). 
 97. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37054-
01, 37067 (2015). 
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contribution o+f flow; export of organic matter; export of food 
resources; and provision of life-cycle dependent aquatic habitat 
(such as foraging, feeding, nesting, breeding, spawning, and use 
as a nursery area) for species located in traditional navigable 
waters, interstate waters, or territorial seas. The effect of an 
upstream water can be significant even when . . . providing . . . 
just one . . . of the functions listed.98 
B. Legal Challenges to the WOTUS Rule 
When the Sixth Circuit reaches the merits of the EPA’s jurisdictional 
claim, the court will be challenged to facilitate a solution that restores and 
maintains the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s 
waters,99 while recognizing, preserving, and protecting the States’ primary 
responsibility and rights to regulate pollution and use of land and water 
resources.100 
The Opposing States contend that the Agencies have failed to conform to 
the rulemaking requirements of the APA.101 Some particularly troubling 
aspects of the final WOTUS Rule are the distance limitations, e.g., “4,000 
feet from the high tide or ordinary high water mark”102 of covered waters, 
which, according to the Opposing States, were not included in the proposed 
rule and thus, are not a “logical outgrowth of the rule proposed.”103 Because 
the distance limitations are not specifically supported by scientific findings, 
they are “not the product of reasoned decision-making [thereby making the 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Id. 
 99. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133. 
 100. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 166-67; Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 737; see also Exec. 
Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999) (reinforcing the importance of 
federalism in agency rulemaking). 
 101. In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 2015); see also Karen Bennett and John 
Henson, Redefining “Waters of the United States”: Is EPA Undermining Cooperative 
Federalism?, Engage Vol. 16, Issue 1 (The Federalist Soc’y), May 5, 2015 (“The comments 
of governors, attorneys general, and various state agencies and departments are nestled 
among over 1,055,000 mass mail comments, 11,800 generally non-substantive individual 
comments, 4,500 anonymous comments, and comments from a broad spectrum of 
businesses, industries, and environmental groups.”) 
 102. In addition to the Opposing States’ many criticisms of the WOTUS Rule, this 
particular aspect of the rule is especially onerous. For instance, when the 4,000-foot buffer is 
applied to the state of Oklahoma, the WOTUS Rule (and all of its legal trappings) covers 
95% of the surface acres in the state. See American Farm Bureau Federation, How WOTUS 
Will Affect Farmers: Completed Maps Showing WOTUS Jurisdiction (2015), available at 
http://www.fb.org/issues/wotus/resources/. 
 103. In re EPA, 803 F.3d at 807. 
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WOTUS Rule] vulnerable to attack as impermissibly ‘arbitrary or 
capricious’ under the APA.”104 
It is not clear whether the significant nexus test is required or whether 
courts may apply the standard set forth by the Rapanos plurality. Following 
the Rapanos decision, the federal circuit courts split in their application of 
the results.105 Although the Agencies have relied primarily, if not 
exclusively, upon Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test, the Rapanos 
plurality test merits consideration, particularly because of the confusion 
created in determining the precise meaning of “significant nexus.” The 
plurality’s requirement that a covered water be a “relatively permanent 
body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters,” or a 
wetland with “a continuous surface connection with [a water of the United 
States], making it difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the 
‘wetland’ begins”106 has emerged as the more workable test.  
The Rapanos plurality test reduces the Agencies’ temptation to impose 
arbitrary distance limitations on their claim of jurisdictional reach by 
eliminating the need to do so. The test imposes a relatively simple, case-by-
case, wetland analysis to determine, scientifically, whether a wetland shares 
a “continuous surface connection” with a covered water. The most difficult 
aspect of such wetland analysis is likely determining the point at which it 
becomes “difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ 
begins,” which seems to require subjectivity.  
Admittedly, the Rapanos plurality test also requires certain exceptions to 
be included under the definition of “waters of the United States,” such as 
the Los Angeles River (a subject of Kennedy’s concern), but these 
exceptions are few in number, limited primarily to the western arid states, 
and easily supported by existing science. It is inappropriate, and perhaps 
absurd, to use the unique characteristics of the Los Angeles River as the 
basis for condoning harsh agency overreach nationwide. 
The holding in Rapanos should be applied under the narrowest grounds 
on which it was formulated.107 Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test is a 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Id. 
 105. Compare United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that the 
EPA could assert jurisdiction either by meeting the standard set forth by the Rapanos 
plurality or by meeting Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus standard), with United States v. 
Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006) (requiring a jurisdictional finding of 
significant nexus). 
 106. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742. 
 107. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court 
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 
the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
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much more expansive interpretation of Congress’s grant of authority to the 
Agencies than that of the plurality. The undefined nature of the significant 
nexus test leads to overreach by the Agencies. Agency overreach leads to 
an abuse of federal power and encroachment upon areas of sovereignty 
traditionally reserved to the States. Because the Rapanos plurality test was 
the narrowest grounds for invalidating the Corps’ jurisdiction over the 
wetlands the Rapanos plurality test should be applied to Agency 
jurisdiction in the case presently before the Sixth Circuit. 
The Rapanos plurality test is the most prudent application of judicial 
authority over the Agencies’ claim of jurisdiction under the CWA because 
it clearly defines the Agencies’ jurisdictional reach, honors Congress’s 
intent, and respects the States’ primary responsibility and rights to regulate 
pollution and use of land and water resources.  
The Rapanos plurality test provides a clear, bright-line rule, subject to 
certain exceptions, which keeps faith with the spirit of cooperative state and 
federal regulation of the nation’s waters. Justice Kennedy conceded that a 
“mere hydrologic connection,” while necessary, might not be sufficient 
without a showing of “some measure of significance of the connection” 
resulting in “effects on water quality [that are not] speculative or 
insubstantial.”108 The Rapanos plurality’s requirements of relative 
permanence and continuous surface connection precisely provide such a 
measure of significance. Beyond these reasonable boundaries, case-specific 
exceptions or additional Congressional action should be required to avoid 
ever more degradation of the nation’s system of federalism and separation 
of power. 
Conclusion 
The WOTUS Rule should be invalidated, in its current formulation, by 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Agencies violated the APA’s notice 
and comment requirements when promulgating the final WOTUS Rule. The 
final rule stretches the meaning of “waters of the United States” by using 
arbitrary distances that are not supported by science, thereby 
simultaneously exceeding Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test while 
precluding its entitlement to Chevron deference. Finally, the WOTUS Rule 
constitutes a substantial impingement on the States’ primary responsibility 
and rights to regulate pollution and use of land and water resources. The 
                                                                                                                 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”) (quoting another source) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 108. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780-84. 
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court should look to the narrower rationale given by the Supreme Court, the 
Rapanos plurality test, for a more workable solution. An issue as important 
as cooperative state and federal regulation of the nation’s waters is worthy 
of a bright-line rule that cannot be obtained through mere application of the 
significant nexus test. Justice Scalia shows how the waters of the United 
States can be crystal clear!109  
 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Sadly, Justice Scalia passed away within twenty-four hours of this article being 
selected for publication. It remains to be seen how his absence from the Court will affect the 
WOTUS Rule. 
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